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Introduction
After playing a National Football League ("NFL") game against
the Denver Broncos in Denver, Colorado on October 21, 2007, Ryan
Clark ("Clark") of the Pittsburgh Steelers became seriously ill and
* Attorney-Advisor with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and
an avid sports fan. I am deeply grateful to my amazing family for their immeasurable
love and support in all things professional and otherwise. You have celebrated my
biggest accomplishments with me, and perhaps more importantly, have steadied me in
challenging times. I am particularly grateful to my older brother, Professor N. Jeremi
Duru, for both inspiring this article and providing his invaluable guidance, thoughts,
and ideas through its completion.
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was hospitalized.' Clark's condition rapidly deteriorated and his
doctors were forced to remove both his spleen and gall bladder to
save his life.2 In addition, Clark lost thirty pounds as well as the rest
of his season because of medical complications related to the
mysterious illness.3 The doctors in Denver ultimately concluded that
Denver's high altitude (Denver is 5,280 feet above sea level), in
addition to the sickle cell trait that Clark carries, prevented oxygen
from flowing to his spleen, thus enlarging it.4
In discussing his near-death experience, Clark admitted having
similar but less severe problems two years earlier as a member of the
Washington Redskins, during another game in Denver.5 He stated,
"[i]t's a blood condition I have that I have to stay on top of, as far as
going to high altitude [sic] and things like that."6 "Dealing with the
weather, overexertion, dehydration - I just need to be smarter." 7
As it turns out, some sports governing bodies are no longer willing
to sit by and allow individual players to police themselves or be
"smarter" about playing with sickle cell trait.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") is one
of those governing bodies. The NCAA first learned of the risk of
death among college football players with sickle cell trait in 1974,
when Polie Poitier, a sophomore defensive back at the University of
Colorado, collapsed during a workout and subsequently died.8 In
response, the NCAA described the risks to collegiate athletes with
sickle cell trait in its medical handbook.9 For a period of time, the
NCAA also recommended that all African-American athletes be
offered testing for sickle cell trait due to a higher incidence of the
trait among African Americans.10
Three decades later, " [i]n 2008, the NCAA took its strongest
stance [up to that point] and formally recommended testing - a
result of a legal settlement with the family of Dale Lloyd II, a Rice
1. Bill Williamson, Sources: Steelers won't play Clark, ESPN (Nov. 8, 2009, 4:44 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4635544.
2. Id.
3. Associated Press, Altitude could preclude Clark's playing, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2009, 5:02
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4617421.
4. Williamson, supra note 1.
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football player whose death in 2006 was linked to the trait."11 The
testing policy, however, remained optional. Unfortunately, sickle
cell trait-related tragedies continued to occur, and of the twenty-one
college football players that collapsed and died because of training
over the past decade, eight of them carried the trait.12 In 2009, the
NCAA acted again, this time proposing mandatory sickle cell trait
testing for all Division I athletes.13
In January 2010, NCAA member-conferences voted on the
proposed mandatory testing but failed to pass the measure, due, in
part, to the belief that mandatory testing could lead to
discrimination against carriers. 14 Nevertheless, later that year, the
Division I Legislative Council passed the measure requiring that all
incoming Division I student-athletes be tested for sickle cell trait,
show proof of a prior test, or sign a waiver releasing an institution of
any liability should the student-athlete decline to be tested. 15
Given the Clark incident, the numerous sickle cell trait-related
deaths in collegiate athletics, particularly football, and the NCAA's
recent mandatory testing policy, the NFL brass is surely to
consider - if not already doing so - mandating sickle cell trait
testing at the professional level. Indeed, the NFL currently requires
that all participants in its annual scouting combine16 be screened for
the trait, but allows each team to decide whether other players are
tested as well.17
Should the NFL expand its current policy and require that every
current and prospective player be tested for sickle cell trait? If you
answered that question in the affirmative, this article posits that as
11. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
12. Id. See also Iliana Lim6n, Sickle cell trait: The silent killer, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June
24, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-24/sports/os-sickle-cell-trait-0724
-20110722 1 sickle-cell-trait-dale-lloyd-ii-olivier-louis (finding that during the past
eleven years, at least seventeen high school and college athletes' deaths have been linked
to sickle cell trait, and millions have been paid in damages).
13. Testing Recommended for Sickle Cell Trait Status, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
Ass'N (June 29, 2009, 8:56 AM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2009/
Association-wide/ testing%2Brecommended%2Bfor%2Bsickle%2Bcell%2Btrait%2Bstatus
06_29 09 ncaa news.html.
14. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
15. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Protocol Decided for Sickle Cell Testing, NATIL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N (Apr. 13, 2010, 3:42 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/ portal/ ncaahome?WCMGLOBALCONTEXT=/ncaa/ ncaa/ ncaa+news/ ncaa+ne
ws+online/2010/division+i/protocol+decided+for+sickle+cell+testing_04_13 10 ncaa_
news.
16. The NFL Scouting Combine is an annual weeklong evaluative event where
college football players perform various physical and mental tests in front of NFL
coaches, general managers, and scouts.
17. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
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an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 the
NFL could be liable for employment discrimination under a
disparate impact theory if it mandates sickle cell trait testing, and
based on the test results, its teams make decisions that adversely
affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of affected
players' employment. Specifically, because sickle cell trait occurs at
a significantly higher rate in African Americans, African-American
players will likely test positive at a higher rate. Moreover, if NFL
teams subsequently make employment decisions that adversely
affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the sickle
cell trait carriers' employment, those players will have a legitimate
claim of employment discrimination based on a disparate impact
theory of liability.
Part II of this article will examine and describe sickle cell trait,
its symptoms, and its prevalence amongst people of African decent.
Part III will thoroughly examine Title VII's prohibition of
employment discrimination, with a focus on the disparate impact
theory of liability, while part IV will analyze the potential disparate
impact claim that African-American players adversely affected by
teams' employment decisions could bring and the teams' likely
defenses. The article will then conclude that African-American
players who test positive could bring cognizable Title VII
employment discrimination claims based on the disparate impact
theory of liability, if the NFL mandates sickle cell trait testing and
the players' teams subsequently make decisions based on these test
results that adversely affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of the players' employment.
I. Sickle Cell Trait, Sports,
and People of African Descent
Sickle cell trait is not a disease.19 Rather, "[i]t is the inheritance
of one gene for normal hemoglobin (A) and one gene for sickle
hemoglobin (S), giving the genotype AS."20 Sickle cell trait does not
turn into sickle cell disease.21 Indeed, people with sickle cell trait
usually do not exhibit any symptoms of the disease and generally
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
19. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2009-10 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE
HANDBOOK 86 (20th ed. 2009); See also Sickle Cell Disease (SCD), CTRS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/
traits.html [hereinafter DISEASE TRAITS].
20. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19.
21. Id.
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lead long and healthy lives.22 By contrast, a person with sickle cell
disease (SS) inherits two abnormal genes, which can cause pain and
other serious medical problems. 23
Sickle cell disease affects millions of people throughout the
world but is particularly common among those with ancestors from
sub-Saharan Africa.24 Specifically, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention estimates that the disease occurs in approximately 1
out of every 500 African-American births.25 More importantly for
this article, however, is the fact that the trait (not the disease) occurs
in approximately 1 in 12 African Americans and rarely (between 1 in
2,000 to 1 in 10,000) in the Caucasian population. 26
Although generally benign, sickle cell trait can cause medical
emergencies under certain conditions. 27 Specifically, sickle cell trait
carriers can experience symptoms of sickle cell disease, such as
splenic sequestration, pain crisis, and sudden death, under extreme
conditions of low oxygen levels (i.e., exercising extremely hard);
high altitudes; increased pressure (i.e., scuba diving); or
dehydration.28 Given the subject of this piece, the remainder of this
article will focus on the effect rigorous exercise has on football
players with the trait.
Sickle cell disease affects a person's red blood cells.29 Healthy
red blood cells are round and move through small blood vessels to
carry oxygen throughout the body.30 In a person with sickle cell
disease, however, some red blood cells become hard, sticky, and
resemble a C-shaped farm tool called a "sickle."31 In this form, the
affected red blood cells are unable to smoothly travel through the
small blood vessels designed for healthy, round blood cells.32
Instead, the sickled blood cells get stuck in the blood vessels, clog
the vessels and disrupt blood flow to various parts of the body.33
The sickled cells also die early, causing a shortage of red blood cells
22. Id; See also CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 19.
23. Sickle Cell Disease (SCD), CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/facts.html [hereinafter DISEASE FACTS].
24. Sickle Cell Disease (SCD), CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.cdc.gov/NCBDDD/sicklecell/data.html [hereinafter DISEASE DATA].
25. Id.
26. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19; DISEASE DATA, supra note 24.
27. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19. See also DISEASE TRAITS, supra
note 19.
28. DISEASE TRAITS, supra note 19.




33. Id; See also Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
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throughout the body.34
While researchers have not conducted many studies examining
the connection between exercise and sickle cell trait, the limited
scientific data available indicates that athletes with the trait
experience the red blood cell mutation described above during
extreme exercise.35 Moreover, affected athletes are more apt to suffer
significant distress, collapse, and even die during strenuous
exercise.36 One such study, performed by the U.S. Armed Forces,
linked sickle cell trait to the sudden and unexplained deaths of many
of its recruits.3 7 The study observed military recruits from 1977 to
1981 and concluded that recruits with sickle cell trait were forty
times more likely to die during basic training than those without the
trait.38 In addition, the study found that the primary cause of the
deaths was severe exertional rhabdomyolysis, and recruits with
sickle cell trait were 200 times more likely to suffer from exertional
rhabdomyolysis than recruits lacking the trait.39
This study, coupled with the increased incidents of exercise-
related deaths and medical emergencies among college athletes with
the trait, particularly football players, forced the NCAA to institute
its recent policy mandating sickle cell trait testing for every incoming
Division I athlete. At the professional level, and in the employment
context, the NFL does not currently require that every player be
tested for sickle cell trait, but is likely considering such a
requirement.40 Not surprisingly, some people and groups have
expressed concerns over mandatory sickle cell trait testing for
athletes.4'
Several criticisms have been leveled against the NCAA's new
mandatory testing policy, including claiming that though athletes
should know their sickle cell trait status, collegiate athletic
departments could use the test results to deny prospective college
athletes the opportunity to compete.42 "'Does it now slide from
protection of the athlete who has [sickle cell trait] by sitting them
34. DISEASE FACTS, supra note 23.
35. DISEASE TRAnS, supra note 19. See also NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, supra
note 19; Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
36. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, supra note 19.
37. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
38. Id.
39. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19. Exertional rhabdomyolysis is
an acute breakdown of muscle fibers resulting in the release of muscle fiber contents
(myoglobin) into the bloodstream.
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out, to maybe losing a scholarship, to maybe not being recruited at
all?"'4 3 Additionally, some argue that there is very little data
showing that sickle cell trait screening saves affected athletes' lives.44
After all, "[o]f the eight football deaths linked to sickle-cell trait in
the past decade, four occurred after a university knew that the
player had the disorder."45
Other critics have challenged the validity of the commonly
accepted nexus between sickle cell trait and exercise-related medical
emergencies.46 Dr. M.A. Bender, director of the Odessa Brown
Comprehensive Sickle Cell Clinic in Seattle, Washington, argues that
little research has been done regarding the connection between
exercise and sickle cell trait.47 Specifically, he stated: "[t]here isn't
the data in terms of how often it occurs, what the real risk is, and
what underlying factors may be involved. . . ."48
Opponents of mandatory sickle cell trait testing also argue that
the NCAA and other sports governing bodies would best serve and
protect carriers of the trait as well as non-carriers by altering training
programs.49 The U.S. Armed Forces, for one, agrees and no longer
tests recruits for the trait.50 Instead, the army has instituted across-
the-board precautions, and since the change in exercise or training
practices, studies have shown that "soldiers with the trait have no
higher risk of dying in basic training than those without." 51 As Dr.
Susan Shurin, director of the National Heart, Lung and Blood
Institute at the National Institutes of Health states, "it may not be
necessary to select a subset of athletes for special treatment" 52
because "[t]he most serious complications of sickle-cell trait can
probably be prevented if they just drink water whenever they need
to, and you avoid really extreme exertion."53
43. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8 (quoting Dr. Lanetta Jordan, Chief Medical Officer
for the Sickle Cell Disease Association of America).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id; See also AM. COLL. SPORTS MED., SICKLE CELL TRAIT 1 (n.d.), available at
http://www.acsm.org/docs/current-comments/sicklecelltrait.pdf (stating that "[a]t this
time, no direct causal evidence has been shown and the relationship between sickle cell
trait and exercise-related rhadbomyolysis is unclear. There is a controversy in the
medical literature concerning the possibility that sickle cell trait increases the risk of
exercise associated sudden death.").








Nevertheless, as more athletes with sickle cell trait continue to
fall ill during and after rigorous exercise, athletic governing bodies
and organizations increasingly recommend sickle cell trait testing,
with the NCAA going the furthest by mandating the test.54 The NFL
currently requires that only its scouting combine participants be
tested for sickle cell trait, while it likely considers a broader
application of that policy. Even so, given the fact that sickle cell trait
occurs at a significantly higher rate in African Americans, the NFL
could still be liable under a Title VII disparate impact theory of
liability if the future teams of the NFL Scouting Combine athletes
make employment decisions that adversely affect the terms,
conditions, or privileges of their employment, based on the sickle
cell trait test results. Of course, the number of potential plaintiffs
would ultimately increase dramatically if the NFL adopts a broader,
mandatory testing policy that includes every current or future NFL
player, irrespective of whether that player participates in the
Scouting Combine.
After recovering from the surgeries that saved his life, Clark
was asked about the NCAA's recent mandatory sickle cell trait
testing policy, and not surprisingly, he supported the policy.5 5 Clark
did, however, acknowledge that his sickle cell trait status was an
issue during his contract negotiations because "[a]nything that can
negatively impact, of course they'll bring those things up because
they're trying to get players as cheap as possible." 56 The remainder
of this article will examine the strength of a Title VII disparate
impact claim African-American players in the NFL could bring if the
NFL mandates sickle cell trait testing and its teams make
employment decisions that adversely affect the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the players' employment because of positive sickle cell
trait tests.
54. The National Athletic Trainers' Association recommends that athletic
departments confirm every athlete's sickle cell trait status during pre-participation
physical examinations. See The National Athletic Trainers' Association (NATA) Releases
"Sickle Cell Trait and the Athlete" Consensus Statement, NAT'L ATHLETIc TRAINERS' Ass'N
(Jun. 27, 2007), http://www.nata.org/NR62107.
55. NATA, supra note 54.
56. Id.
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II. Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Disparate Impact
Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
it "prohibits employers from selecting, classifying, segregating,
limiting, discharging or in any way discriminating against
employees based on race, religion, color, national origin or sex."57
Specifically, it states that it shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.58
Moreover, under Title VII, plaintiffs may proceed under two
separate legal theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
A. Disparate Treatment
The disparate treatment theory of liability is the most easily
understood form of discrimination and requires that the plaintiff
prove intentional discrimination. 59 The first Supreme Court case
analyzing the disparate treatment theory of liability, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, also set out the burden-shifting method of
proof most often utilized in Title VII cases. 60
Under this burden-shifting method of proof, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a
presumption that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.61
As McDonnell Douglass Corp. involved a failure to hire, the Court
stated that the plaintiff there, and presumably in most "failure to
hire" cases, could establish a prima facie case by:
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
57. Patricia Pattison & Philip E. Varca, The Demise of the Disparate Impact Theory, 29
AM. Bus. L.J. 413,417 (1991).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
59. Pattison & Varca, supra note 56, at 417. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
60. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
61. Id. at 802-03.
273
and was qualified for a job which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 62
If the plaintiff is able to make out this prima facie case, a burden
of production then shifts to the defendant, who must put into
evidence some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment decision.63 Carrying that burden destroys
the presumption of discrimination, but the plaintiff may still prevail
if she is able to prove (includes the burdens of production and
persuasion) that the employer's asserted legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the challenged employment action is actually
nothing more than pretext for the underlying discriminatory
motivation.64
B. Disparate Impact
Conversely, the employer's motivation is irrelevant under a
disparate impact theory of liability. 65 Rather, a disparate impact
plaintiff must show that a particular facially neutral employment
practice disproportionately affects members of a protected class
under Title VII.66 As the Court put it, "[u]nder the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 67
The disparate impact theory of employment discrimination
liability is based on the premise that "'some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrim-
ination.'" 68 Simply stated, Title VII prohibits overt discrimination as
well as practices that may appear fair in form, but are discriminatory
in practice.69 The disparate impact theory of litigation is utilized in
reaching the latter. The touchstone in a disparate impact case is
business necessity. Under this principle, if an employment practice
operates to exclude members of a protected class under Title VII and
62. Id. at 802.
63. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802
64. Id. at 804.
65. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
66. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
67. Id. at 430.
68. Pattison & Varca, supra note 56, at 419 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)).
69. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited. 70
Plaintiffs proceeding under a disparate impact theory of liability
generally establish their prima facie case and demonstrate the
discriminatory effect of facially neutral employment practices or
policies using statistical studies.71 Disparate impact plaintiffs must
specifically identify the challenged employment practice and offer
"statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or
promotions because of their membership in a protected group." 72 As
with a disparate treatment claim, if a disparate impact plaintiff is
able to make this showing and establish a prima facie case, there is a
presumption that the challenged employment practice is
discriminatory.73 The burden of proof shifts to the employer to rebut
that presumption by either challenging the validity or probative
value of the plaintiff's statistics - proving that the challenged
practice did not cause the statistical disparity - or demonstrating
that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with a
business necessity.74
To establish that the challenged practice is justified by a
business necessity, an employer must show that the challenged
practice "accurately - but not perfectly - ascertains an applicant's
ability to perform successfully the job in question."75 If the employer
is able to make this showing, the plaintiff may still succeed if she can
persuade the court that the employer could use other practices or
policies that would be less discriminatory while still serving the
employer's legitimate employment goals.76 "Such a showing would
be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a
'pretext' for discrimination."7 7 Note, however, that to be considered,
the plaintiff's proposed alternative practices must be as effective as
the employer's chosen practice.78 Moreover, factors such as the cost
or other burdens are relevant in determining whether the proposed
alternative practices would be equally as effective in serving the
70. Id.
71. Pattison & Varca, supra note 56, at 419.
72. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
73. Id. at 1001.
74. Id. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
75. MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION 258 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2008). See also Watson, 487 U.S. at 1005.
76. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
77. ZIMMER, supra note 75, at 267 (internal citation omitted).
78. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
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employer's legitimate employment goals.79
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court addressed whether Duke
Power Company ("Company") violated Title VII when it required
that employees or applicants have a high school diploma and pass a
standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment
or transfer.80 Notably, both requirements operated to disqualify
African-American employees and applicants at a substantially
higher rate than white employees and applicants.81
The thirteen African-Americans plaintiffs in Griggs worked at
the Company's Dan River Steam Station, along with eighty-one
white employees. 82 "The Dan River Steam Station was organized
into five operating departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3)
Operations, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and Test." 83 Under
the company's policy, all fourteen African-American employees at
the Dan River Steam Station were employed in the Labor
department, where the highest paying jobs paid less than the lowest
paying jobs in the other four departments, which employed only
whites.84
In 1955, the Company instituted a policy requiring a high school
education as a condition for initial assignment to any department
except the Labor department.85 Additionally, after the passage of
Title VII in 1965, the Company abandoned its policy of restricting
African Americans to the Labor department but made the
completion of high school a prerequisite to transfer from the Labor
department to any other department.86 This seemingly neutral
policy effectively prevented the African-American employees from
obtaining the higher paying jobs in any of the other four
departments. Not surprisingly, "[f]rom the time the high school
requirement was instituted to the time of trial ... white employees
hired before the time of the high school education requirement
continued to perform satisfactorily and achieve promotions in the
'operating' departments."8 7
Finally, on July 2, 1965, the day Title VII became effective, the
Company required that every applicant seeking a position in any
department, except for the Labor department, register a satisfactory
79. Id.
80. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
81. Id. at 426.
82. Id.
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score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests as well as have a
high school diploma. 88 The two tests were the Wonderlic Personnel
Test, which purportedly measures general intelligence, and the
Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test.89 Neither test relevantly
or directly measured the test-taker's ability to learn to perform a job
or category of jobs within any of the relevant departments.90
In determining whether the Company's employment conditions
violated Title VII, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
found for the Company, holding that the African-American plaintiffs
had not shown the Company intentionally discriminated against
them.91 Both courts found the high school diploma requirement and
the new tests "applied fairly to whites and negroes alike." 9 2 The
Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of a
discriminatory purpose, use of such requirements was permitted by
[the Civil Rights Act of 1964]."93 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed.
The Court found for the African-American employees, stating,
"[u]nder the [Civil Rights Act of 1964], practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." 94 The Court acknowledged
that Title VII does not require that employers hire individuals
simply because they were formally subject to discrimination or
because they are members of a minority group.95 It does, however,
require the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrim-
inate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." 96
In this case, the high school diploma requirement and the tests
represented arbitrary and unnecessary employment barriers in front
of the African-American employees because neither bore a
"demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which [they were] used." 97 Instead, the company adopted both
requirements "without meaningful study of their relationship to job-
88. Id. at 427-28.
89. Id. at 428.
90. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428.
91. Id. at 429.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 430.
95. Id. at 430-31.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.
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performance ability." 98 The Court relied, in part, on the fact that
employees who had not completed high school or taken the required
tests continued to perform satisfactorily in those departments that
now required the high school diploma and tests.99 Specifically, the
Court stated that " [tihe promotion record of present employees who
would not be able to meet the new criteria thus suggests the
possibility that the requirements may not be needed even for the
limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of advancement
within the Company." 00
The Court's reasoning in Griggs and its other disparate impact
cases thus begs the following question: could a group of African-
American football players in the NFL bring a successful employment
discrimination claim against the NFL and its teams if the NFL
mandates sickle cell trait tests and its teams make employment
decisions that adversely affect the terms or conditions of the players'
employment based on positive sickle cell trait tests?
III. Disparate Impact Liability for
Sickle Cell Trait Testing in the NFL
As a threshold matter, the employment actions that the NFL or
its member teams take in response to positive sickle cell trait tests
would determine whether the players could make out a legitimate
employment discrimination claim based on the disparate impact
theory. If, as proponents of mandatory sickle cell trait testing
contend, the NFL and its teams respond to positive sickle cell trait
tests by simply altering training practices, adopting relevant
contingency plans, or taking various other across-the-board medical
precautions, it would be extremely difficult for the prospective
plaintiffs to argue that those practices adversely affected the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of their employment. However, our
litigious society and U.S. business needs and desires to control and
limit liability, suggest that the NFL and its teams would likely do
more than just take medical precautions. As Clark stated when
acknowledging his positive sickle cell trait status presented an issue
during his contract negotiations, "[i]t's business."101
In lieu of taking any employment actions that could be
perceived as discriminatory or unfair, the NFL may adopt the
NCAA's approach to the mandatory testing policy and require that
98. Id.
99. Id. at 431-32.
100. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
101. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
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players who refuse the sickle cell trait test sign a waiver releasing the
NFL and the relevant team of any liability should the player suffer
any illness because of his sickle cell trait. At first glance, the waiver
requirement appears dispositive of the NFL's liability concerns. A
closer review, however, suggests that the affected players could
assert a good-faith, non-frivolous claim that receiving less liability
protection than other employees adversely affects the "terms and
conditions" of their employment because of their race.
Sickle cell trait disproportionately affects African Americans
and, as such, African-American players would be disproportionately
affected by a policy requiring that players sign waivers releasing the
NFL and the relevant team of any liability should the player suffer
any illness because of his sickle cell trait. Accordingly, a group of
African-American players could effectively argue that receiving less
liability protection from their employer adversely affects the "terms
and conditions" of their employment. More importantly, the
affected players could demonstrate that they were subject to the
adverse employment action because of a policy that disproportion-
ately affected African Americans.
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, the NFL and its
teams may seek to further limit their perceived liability by
implementing a number of practices. The most obvious would be to
offer sickle cell trait carriers less lucrative and shorter contracts.
Again, because sickle cell trait disproportionately affects African
Americans, the affected African-American players would likely be
able to establish a prima facie case that the employment actions
related to their contracts adversely affect the "compensation and
terms" of their employment because of their race.
Admittedly, the situation presented here is unlike a typical
disparate impact case wherein the challenged practice or policy, in
and of itself, leads directly to the discrimination. In Griggs, for
instance, the high school diploma requirement and the test results
determined the employees' job placement without any other
intervening acts by the employer. By contrast, here, the test results
by themselves do not automatically adversely affect the terms and
conditions of the affected players' employment. That is, unless the
NFL or its teams declare that players found to be carriers of sickle
cell trait will automatically be subject to some action (that could
violate Title VII), a positive sickle cell trait test result would not, by
itself, adversely affect the carrier's employment. The NFL is unlikely
to ever make such a declaration, however, because it is a
sophisticated organization and will likely realize that making such a
proclamation would turn this situation into a typical disparate
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impact case, making it easier for affected players to attack the testing
rule. Instead, the NFL is more likely to avoid this traditional
disparate impact scenario and ensuing liability by giving its teams
the discretion to take the additional steps described above. If the
NFL were allowed to circumvent Title VII's mandate in this manner,
Title VII would lose much of its meaning.
Although the subject of this article would represent a unique
twist to a disparate impact case, where the NFL or its teams takes
one or more of the employment actions described above, the affected
players should be able to make out a case of disparate impact
employment discrimination based on race. The adverse employ-
ment actions the NFL may take will almost certainly disproportion-
ately affect African-American players because of the much higher
rate of the trait in African Americans. As such, the affected players
could link the adverse employment actions to the facially neutral
sickle cell trait test by arguing that the NFL or its teams are liable
because the mandatory sickle cell trait testing leads to employment
discrimination under Title VII.
At this juncture, pursuant to the burden-shifting model
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp., the
burden would shift to the NFL or the relevant team to either
discredit the players' statistical evidence of a disparity or show that
its practice is job-related and consistent with a business necessity.
The NFL could choose to challenge the players' statistical evidence,
but given the relative ease with which affected players could show a
nexus between a positive sickle cell trait test and the less favorable
terms of employment, the NFL will likely argue that its testing
policy is job-related and consistent with a business necessity.
A. Business Necessity
The NFL is a professional football league operated to entertain
its fans and make a profit. Moreover, the NFL and its teams employ
the players, whose primary job function is to practice and play at the
highest athletic level. As such, the NFL could make a relatively
strong argument that learning about its employees' ability to
exercise rigorously without suffering medical complications is job-
related and consistent with a business necessity. In Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, the Supreme Court stated that when asserting
the business necessity defense, the employer must show that the
challenged employment practice is "necessary to safe and efficient
job performance."10 2 Put simply, the challenged practice "must
102. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005 (1988).
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directly relate to [an employee's] ability to perform the job
effectively."os Where, as here, "performing the job effectively"
involves strenuous or rigorous exercise, and sickle cell trait carriers
are more prone to medical complications because of strenuous or
rigorous exercise, the NFL and its teams could successfully argue
that the mandatory sickle cell trait test is job-related and consistent
with a business necessity.
The more important question, however, is whether the
employment actions described above would open the NFL and its
teams up to employment discrimination liability under Title VII in
spite of a probable finding that mandatory sickle cell trait testing is
related to a business necessity. Because there remain alternative
practices, including altering the players' training regimen and
possibly providing more breaks during games, that would still serve
the NFL's legitimate employment goals, that question must be
answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, a finding that mandatory
sickle cell trait testing constitutes a business necessity should not
insulate the NFL and its teams from liability if they take any of the
employment actions described above.
B. For Your Own Good
The NFL would also likely argue that mandatory sickle cell trait
testing is necessary to protect players from themselves. The NFL
could assume a paternalistic role in contending that it and its teams
are acting, not out of a need or desire to protect the NFL brand, but
for the well-being of its players. This argument, however, lacks
merit.
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 1 04 the Supreme Court examined
whether an employer, seeking to protect fetuses, could exclude
women from certain jobs because of the women's potential to
become pregnant. There, Johnson Controls, Incorporated ("Johnson
Controls"), a battery manufacturer, instituted a policy prohibiting
pregnant women or women capable of becoming pregnant from
working in certain positions within the company that involved lead
exposure.105 The dispute involved a facially discriminatory policy,
which the Court found violated Title VII despite Johnson Controls'
argument that the safety exception to the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualificationl0 6 ("BFOQ") defense permitted the policy.
103. Id.
104. UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 187 (1991).
105. Id. at 192.
106. A BFOQ is a defense most commonly asserted in disparate treatment cases that
allows an employer to discriminate based on religion, sex, or national origin in certain
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Specifically, the Court stated that:
Johnson Controls' professed moral and ethical concerns about the
welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of
female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of future children
must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise
them rather than to the employers who hire those parents. 07
What's more, the Court's "cases have stressed that
discrimination on the basis of sex because of safety concerns is
allowed only in narrow circumstances." 08
One such case was Dothard v. Rawlinson.109 In Dothard, the
plaintiff, Dianne Rawlinson, sued the Alabama Board of Corrections
after it denied her application to work as a corrections counselor.110
At the time Rawlinson applied for employment, the Alabama Board
of Corrections required that correctional counselors weigh at least
120 pounds and be at least five feet and two inches tall."' The board
of corrections also established gender criteria for assigning
correctional counselors to "contact" positions, which required
"continual close physical proximity to inmates of [an] institution."1n2
Rawlinson alleged that the height and weight requirements violated
Title VII because they discriminated on the basis of sex.113
Notably, "[iun considering the effect of the minimum height and
weight standards on [employment as a corrections counselor], the
District Court found that the 5' 2" requirement would operate to
exclude 33.29% of the women in the United States between the ages
of 18-79, while excluding only 1.28% of men between the same
ages." 114 Additionally, "[tlhe 120-pound weight restriction would
exclude 22.29% of the women and 2.35% of the men in this age
group."1 5 As a result, "[w]hen the height and weight restrictions are
combined, Alabama's statutory standards would exclude 41.3% of
the female population while excluding less than 1% of the male
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. 42 U.S.C §
2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
107. Johnson, 499 U.S. at 206.
108. Id. at 202.
109. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
110. Id. at 323.
111. Id. at 323-24.
112. Id. at 325.
113. Id. at 323.
114. Id. at 329.
115. Id.
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population."116 Indeed, of the board of corrections' 435 corrections
counselors, only fifty-six of them were women.117 Not surprisingly,
the District Court found (and the Supreme Court agreed) that
Rawlinson made out a prima facie case of unlawful sex
discrimination.118
In rebutting the presumption of discrimination, the board of
corrections argued that the height and weight requirements were
job-related.119 Specifically, Alabama argued that the height and
weight requirements had a relationship to strength, "a sufficient but
unspecified amount of which is essential to effective job performance
as a correctional counselor."120 The Court, however, disagreed
because Alabama failed to produce evidence "correlating the height
and weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength
thought essential to good job performance."121 The Court stated:
[i]f the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide,
their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test
for applicants that measures strength directly. Such a test, fairly
administered, would fully satisfy the standards of Title VII
because it would be one that 'measure(s) the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract."'
As such, the Court found that the height and weight
requirements violated Title VII.123
The Court was, however, more receptive to Alabama's
argument in support of its gender requirement in assigning
corrections counselors to "contact" positions. Alabama contended,
and the Court agreed, that given the rampant violence and jungle
atmosphere within Alabama's penitentiaries, and the fact that
approximately twenty percent of the male prisoners were sex
offenders and unavoidably scattered throughout the penitentiaries'
dormitory facilities, the gender requirement in filling "contact"
corrections counselor positions was lawful as a BFOQ.124
It is critical to note, however, that in holding Alabama's gender
requirement to be lawful, the Court indicated that the danger to the
116. Id. at 329-30.
117. Id. at 327.
118. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330.
119. Id. at 331.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 332.
123. Id.
124. See generally id. at 334-37.
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female corrections counselors did not justify discrimination. 125
Instead, Alabama's gender requirement survived because of the
unique and violent nature of Alabama's penitentiaries, and because
more was "at stake than . . . an individual woman's decision to
weigh and accept the risks of employment in a 'contact' position in a
maximum-security male prison." 126  Dothard tolerated sex
discrimination, not because the Alabama Board of Corrections
sought to protect its female employees, but because sex was related
to a contact corrections counselor's ability to maintain prison
security. 127
Dothard and Johnson Controls, Inc. are dissimilar to the sickle cell
trait-related dilemma examined herein in that they both involved a
facially discriminatory policy and a BFOQ defense. The Court's
reasoning, however, regarding an employer's paternalistic claim that
challenged discrimination is necessary for the employees' safety, is
persuasive and instructive. That is, violating Title VII because of
safety concerns is allowed in only the narrowest of circumstances.
Where, as here, no more is at stake than an individual player's
decision to weigh and accept the risks of playing football with sickle
cell trait, the NFL and its teams should not be allowed to
discriminate against affected players by arguing that the
discrimination is for the players' own good.
C. Tort Liability as a Defense
In defending mandatory sickle cell trait testing and even the
subsequent employment actions taken, the NFL and its teams could
argue that the test and employment actions are necessary to protect
against potentially crippling tort liability. This concern, however, is
not enough to avoid liability where the NFL or its teams take
employment actions similar to those described above. In addition to
rejecting Johnson Controls, Inc.'s contention that the safety exception
to the BFOQ defense justified its policy excluding pregnant women
or women capable of becoming pregnant from working in positions
involving lead exposure, the Court addressed tort liability and the
idea that compliance with Title VII did not require that employers
ignore the social cost of liability for a potential injury to its
employees. 128
The Court acknowledged that Johnson Controls, Inc. was not
125. See id. at 335.
126. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
127. Id.
128. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 208-10 (1991).
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unreasonable in considering its potential tort liability for injuries to
its employees' fetuses.129 This was especially reasonable given the
fact that at the time, more than forty states recognized a right to
recover for a prenatal injury based either on negligence or wrongful
death.o30 Nevertheless, the Court stated that permitting an employer
to ignore Title VII because of potential tort liability in this kind of
situation was unnecessary because "without negligence, it would be
difficult for a court to find liability on the part of the employer."131
Specifically, the Court stated that "[i]f, under general tort principles,
Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer
fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted
negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at
best."132
Similarly, the possible NFL employment actions described
above in response to sickle cell trait tests would violate Title VII.
Moreover, the NFL could minimize or eliminate its potential liability
for sickle cell trait-related injuries if it fully informs its affected
players of the risks involved with playing with the trait and
consistently acts with the requisite amount of care. As such,
potential tort liability should not be a defense to or justification for
mandatory sickle cell trait testing that leads to unfavorable
employment terms that would disproportionately affect the NFL's
African-American players.
D. Judicial Hostility Towards Disparate Impact
Finally, in thinking about the likelihood that a group of African-
American players in the NFL could successfully bring an
employment discrimination claim based on race, we must consider
the obvious real-world question: could a group of African-American
players realistically convince a judge that the NFL is discriminating
against them because of race despite the fact that almost seventy
percent of the NFL's players are African American?133
After Griggs, the Supreme Court began what appeared to be a
concerted effort to limit the applicability or effectiveness of the
disparate impact theory through its decisions in Watson and Wards
129. See id. at 208.
130. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 208.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. RICHARD LAPCHIK ET AL., THE 2010 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: NFL 3
(2010) (stating that "[diuring the 2009 NFL season ... the percentage of African-
American players remained constant at 67 percent.").
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Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.134 In Watson, the Court limited the use of
the disparate impact model to "appropriate" cases without defining
an "appropriate" case,135 and more importantly, in Wards Cove
Packing Co., the Court made some dramatic changes to the
evidentiary standards for disparate impact cases, thus raising the
plaintiff's burden of proof. 136 The Court's decisions in those two
cases evidenced hostility towards the disparate impact theory of
liability and signaled an end to its relevancy.137
In response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
included an amendment to Title VII providing a statutory basis for
disparate impact law and overruling much of the Court's opinion in
Wards Cove Packing Co.138  Nevertheless, many judges remain
suspicious of or hostile towards the disparate impact theory of
liability. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ricci v.
DeStafano,139 suggests that the Court has resumed its pre-1991 Civil
Rights Act assault on the disparate impact theory of discrimination.
In Ricci, the city of New Haven ("City"), Connecticut, gave its
firefighters a civil service test to determine which firefighters would
qualify for promotions.140 The white firefighters passed the test at a
much higher rate than the minority firefighters, which led minority
firefighters to argue that the test should be discarded because of its
disparate impact on minority firefighters.141 Conversely, the white
firefighters argued that the test was fair and neutral, and threatened
to sue the City if, relying on the statistical racial disparity, it ignored
the test results in making promotion decisions.142
In the end, the City invalidated the test because of potential
disparate impact liability, and the white firefighters and one Latin-
American firefighter sued the City and its officials for failing to
certify the test.143 The plaintiffs alleged that the City's action was
racially motivated and violated Title VII's disparate treatment
provision as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.144 The District Court and U.S.
134. Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
135. See generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
136. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 642-79.
137. See Pattison & Varca, supra note 56, at 416 (arguing that the disparate impact
theory of liability is dying).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
139. Ricci v. DeStafano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found for the City, but the
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court did not address the plaintiffs' Equal Protection
Clause claim but found for the plaintiffs because "race-based action
like the City's in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the
employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate
impact statute." 145 In other words, after Ricci and its ambiguous but
significant "strong basis in evidence" standard, employers will likely
be liable for intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment
theory of liability where they act to avoid a disparate impact on a
protected class.
More importantly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
suggested that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
amendment, and thus, unconstitutional. 146 Scalia confronted the
proverbial elephant in the room, stating that the resolution of the
Ricci matter "merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will
have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection?"14 7
What's more, Scalia clearly indicated that he, and presumably
the other judges that found for the plaintiffs in Ricci, would
invalidate the disparate impact provisions of Title VII when that
"evil day" comes. He stated: "Title VII's disparate impact provisions
place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to
evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions
based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial
decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory." 148 "And
of course the purportedly benign motive for disparate impact
provisions cannot save the statute."149 While a thorough discussion
of the constitutionality or survival of the disparate impact provisions
of Title VII is beyond the scope of this article, scholars have
examined the issue and concluded that many judges remain hostile
towards the disparate impact theory of liability, which is unlikely to
survive many more court challenges. 50
145. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
146. Id. at 2682-84.
147. Id. at 2681-82.
148. Id. 2682.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Eang L. Ngov, When "The Evil Day" Comes, Will Title VII's Disparate
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This overt hostility towards the disparate impact theory of
employment discrimination would undoubtedly make it more
difficult for the affected group of African-American players
described herein to convince a judge that the NFL is discriminating
against them because of their race. The Supreme Court justices as
well as the many other skeptical judges, however, must be guided by
the clear and unambiguous language of Title VII's disparate impact
provision, which provides that a plaintiff can establish that her
employer is violating Title VII by simply showing her "employer
uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race."15 1
Here, because sickle cell trait occurs at a significantly higher rate
in African-Americans and mandatory testing would likely result in
unfavorable employment terms that disproportionately affect
African-American players, nothing more is required. Without the
disparate impact theory of liability, employers would surely be able
to craft seemingly benign employment practices that would
adversely affect various protected classes. Accordingly, Congress
may need to act again to prevent the Supreme Court from making
covert employment discrimination the status quo.
Conclusion
Sickle cell trait occurs in approximately 1 in 12 African
Americans but rarely in Caucasians, occurring only 1 in every 2,000
to 1 in every 10,000.152 The trait does not develop into sickle cell
Impact Provision be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60
AM. U.L. REV. 535, 541 (2011) (concluding that "the disparate impact provision is unlikely
to pass the narrowly tailored requirement and risks being invalidated on 'the evil day'
when the provision is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause"); Girardeau A.
Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1163 (2010) (stating that "the Supreme Court
has not only refused to recognize the legitimacy of disparate impact claims for
constitutional purposes, but its recent Ricci decision seems intent on nullifying
congressional disparate impact claims for statutory purposes as well"); Kenneth L.
Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
53, 55 (2009) (finding that "disparate impact is also sometimes used to level racial
disparities that do not arise from intentional or unconscious discrimination. Equal
protection does not permit state actors to take race-conscious actions for this purpose.
Because Title VII's disparate-impact provision is based in significant part on this less-
than-compelling rationale, this article will argue that it must be narrowed or struck
down"); William Gordon, The Evolution of the Disparate Impact Theory of Title VII: A
Hypothetical Case Study, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 529, 551 (2007) (stating that "the rights that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 bestowed upon employees are slowly being stripped away
by the lower courts").
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
152. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19; DISEASE DATA, supra note 24.
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disease, and carriers of the trait typically lead long and healthy
lives.153 The trait can, however, cause symptoms of the disease
under extreme conditions of low oxygen levels (exercising extremely
hard), high altitudes, increased pressure (scuba diving), or
dehydration.154
Recently, a number of athletes with sickle cell trait have fallen ill
and some have even died during or after rigorous exercise. In
response, last year, the NCAA passed a measure requiring that
every incoming Division I athlete be tested for sickle cell trait, show
proof of a prior test, or sign a waiver releasing an institution of any
liability should the student-athlete decline to be tested.155 The
NCAA enacted this rule despite concerns that sickle cell trait carriers
would be discriminated against or denied the chance to compete.56
The NFL is likely not far behind.
The NFL currently requires that only its scouting combine
participants be tested for sickle cell trait, while it probably considers
a broader application of that policy.157 More importantly, although
the application of the NCAA's new rule in the collegiate athletics
context does not violate any laws, as an employer, the NFL is subject
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
employment discrimination. As such, because sickle cell trait occurs
at a significantly higher rate in African Americans, African-
American players in the NFL with the trait would probably have a
legitimate claim of employment discrimination based on a disparate
impact theory of liability if the NFL mandates sickle cell trait tests
and its teams begin to make employment decisions that adversely
affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the
players' employment based on positive test results.
In defending against such a claim, the NFL would likely be
successful in arguing that because an NFL player's job is to perform
at the highest of athletic levels, a mandatory sickle cell trait testing
policy that seeks to determine whether a player can safely and
effectively perform athletically is permissible because it is job-related
and consistent with a business necessity. Nevertheless, if the NFL
goes beyond testing its employees and instituting medical
precautions by taking employment actions that adversely affect the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of affected players'
153. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 19; DISEASE TRAITS, supra
note 19.
154. DISEASE TRAITS, supra note 19.
155. Hosick, supra note 15.
156. Thomas & Zarda, supra note 8.
157. See generally id.
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employment, the NFL should be liable under a disparate impact
theory of liability despite a finding that the mandatory testing
constitutes a business necessity. After all, the NFL could still achieve
its employment objectives by altering the players' exercise routines
and taking various other across-the-board precautions.
Additionally, pursuant to unambiguous Supreme Court
language, discriminating against a protected class because of safety
concerns is allowed only in narrow circumstances, 58 and the
situation described herein is not narrow enough. Finally, the NFL
should not be permitted to ignore Title VII because of its concern for
potential tort liability where its players suffer sickle cell trait-related
injuries. As the Supreme Court's reasoning in Johnson Controls, Inc.
indicates, Title VII's proscription of the questionable employment
practices described earlier is not inconsistent with the NFL's need to
manage its tort liability. Rather, to minimize or eliminate its
potential liability for sickle cell trait-related injuries, the NFL only
need fully inform its players of the risks associated with playing
with the trait and consistently act with the requisite amount of care.
158. See, e.g., LLAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991).
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